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The portrait of Justice Potter Stewart that hangs in my office is your
typical law clerk's memento: an official, black and white Supreme Court
photograph that the Justice autographed and gave to me at the end of my
clerkship with him in the 1967 Term. The figure in that official photo-
graph, as you might expect, looks every inch like your "typical" Supreme
Court Justice: black robe, penetrating gaze, serious demeanor-a study in
earnest reflection and solemn, if not quite stern, reserve. That picture of
Justice Stewart always brings to my mind these words from Milton:
A pillar of the state; deep on his front engraven
Deliberation sat and public care'
And well might deliberation sit upon his features, for deliberation, which
constitutes much of the business of a Supreme Court Justice, was always
Potter Stewart's forte.
He was less interested in pursuing a unified philosophical vision than
in determining what the law, as he understood it, required in the case at
hand. And his most consistent philosophy was his skepticism about the
virtues of apparently consistent philosophies. Never an ideologue, Justice
Stewart found himself at the Court's "center" not out of political predilec-
tion, but because his habit of mind was to start from a position of equi-
poise, and from there to assess the competing arguments of the parties
before him. What the particular parties in a case had to say mattered
greatly to this Justice; he saw the Court's business as that of deciding
cases, not of arbitrating causes. Thus he was ever the careful student of
the briefs and, during oral argument, one of the most active Jus-
tices-which is to say, from the perspective of one who has argued before
him, one of the most relentless and demanding.
Yet for Potter Stewart the real labor of deciding a case came when the
Justices deliberated at their weekly conference. For him the great joy of
the Court's work was this collegial colloquy, the interplay of advocacy at
the hands of nine master craftsmen of that art. The Justice was not one
for "lobbying" other members of the Court before the conference; such
maneuvers were not his way. Indeed, if he sensed that a majority of the
Court had come to the conference as a united front, not to engage in spir-
t Ralph S. Tyler, Jr. Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
1. J. MILTON, PARADISE LOST, bk. II, lines 302-03, at 36 (S. Elledge ed. 1975).
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ited exchange but to impose a pre-engineered fait accompli, he felt
cheated of that opportunity for collective deliberation which was for him
the soul of the Court's work.
This is not to say that Justice Stewart never struggled against an ap-
parent consensus of his Brethren. When the Court considered Wither-
spoon v. Illinois, the Justice for some time found himself utterly alone in
arguing that the death sentence in that case had to be reversed. But he
gamely endured in his advocacy until, in the end, all but three members of
the Court agreed that: "Whatever else might be said of capital punish-
ment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury cannot be
squared with the Constitution."2
When the Court considered Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,' Justice
Stewart's confidence in his own convictions proved positively infectious. I
initially wrote for the Justice a rather timid memorandum suggesting. that,
amidst the racial strife of the mid-60's, it seemed unlikely that the civil
rights statute before the Court would bring forth much fruit, since it had
been barren and unattended for a full century. The Justice strode into
chambers the next morning and with almost innocent exasperation asked
why I found it so hard to grasp that Congress had, in what to him seemed
plain language, guaranteed the black man's "freedom to buy whatever a
white man can buy," and his "right to live wherever a white man can
live."4 The Justice seemed disappointed that even a brash young clerk
fresh from law school could be willing to capitulate to a century of unex-
amined, pussy-footing, prudential concerns, and so reluctant to seize upon
unambiguous statutory language that simply cried out for a recognition
that Congress meant what it had said. Armed with the courage of Justice
Stewart's conviction, I sequestered myself in the Supreme Court library
and emerged two months later with ample historical evidence to support
the Justice's insight into the statute's text. Needless to say, I was con-
vinced-and so was the Court, for all but two of the Brethren joined his
opinion.
As well as it captures Justice Stewart's serious, deliberative frame of
mind, that de rigueur, black and white glossy photograph-mass-
produced for public dissemination-misses nuances of the Justice's per-
sonality best revealed in the painting that those who had served as his law
clerks commissioned in 1983-a painting which now hangs in the Su-
preme Court building. The face that looks out from that portrait is less
somber: a warm smile plays about the lips; a wry spirit dances in the eyes.
The Justice's reserve, after all, was born not of disdain, but of innate
2. 391 U.S. 510, 523 (1968).
3. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
4. 392 U.S. at 443.
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shyness-and of an appreciation of the demands of his position. The exu-
berant prankster who once talked his kid brother into putting a dead frog
in the salad bowl had of necessity been tamed by his profession and by his
judicial responsibilities. Yet underneath that lugubrious judge's robe
lurked a man who relished wit and retained a sense of whimsy. Potter
Stewart took the law, the Court, and his role as a Justice very seriously
indeed, but he always resisted the impulse to take himself too seriously.
For all his deep and abiding faith in the Court's deliberative process,
Justice Stewart could not help being amused at some of the turns it could
take. Framed on the wall of my study is a note that the Justice scribbled
to me during one of the Court's conferences:
Larry,
The indication is that A.F. [Justice Abe Fortas] will join our Katz
[opinion]. With such prompt and enthusiastic support from such an
unexpected quarter, maybe we better re-read the memo carefully to
see what we say (and what we don't) ....
More often, Justice Stewart mocked himself. He once lamented in dissent
that the Court had effectively overruled an important opinion he had only
recently written. When a subsequent decision confirmed that his mourn-
ing had in fact been premature, the Justice smiled at his own error, and
filed a short concurring opinion-with a "cf." to Mark Twain-stating
that it was "gratifying to note that my report of the demise of Fuentes v.
Shevin seems to have been greatly exaggerated."5
Although he never took himself too seriously, Justice Stewart did not
presume to lecture his Brethren in this respect. I remember an afternoon
when he told me that I must excise from a draft opinion a citation to a
prior case in which Justice Black had dissented. Justice Stewart chuckled
as he explained that, if we wanted Justice Black to join "our" opinion, we
would have to remember that Hugo Black would never sign onto an opin-
ion which displayed the bad judgment to rely, even in passing, upon an
earlier decision that had obviously been in error.
But when the integrity of the Court itself, and not merely the eccentric-
ities of its Members, was at stake, Justice Stewart's smile faded and his
resolve hardened. In 1967, the Justice dissented from the Court's denial of
certiorari in a case testing the legality of the undeclared war in Vietnam,
Mora v. McNamara.' The Justice knew that a judicial declaration that
American involvement in the Vietnam War was unlawful would be politi-
cal dynamite; he recognized that the constitutionality of the draft, and of
5. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, 417 U.S. 601, 608 (1975).
6. 387 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1967).
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the war itself, might well prove to be nonjusticiable questions, committed
by the Constitution to the political branches. But the Justice fervently
believed that, even if he and his Brethren were ultimately to determine
that the courts should play no role in resolving these explosive issues, the
Court nevertheless owed the American people a forthright explanation of
why that was so. As it turns out, Justice Stewart had clear evidence that
the draft dissent he had circulated among his Brethren had been taken to
the White House by Justice Fortas. And Justice Fortas had left little
doubt that President Johnson would not take kindly to even the smallest
judicial hint that his favorite "police action" was beyond the constitutional
pale. But Potter Stewart stared down Abe Fortas's veiled-and plainly
improper-threats of retaliation and filed his dissent anyway.
Justice Stewart believed that the Supreme Court's refusal to grapple
with the constitutional implications of the Vietnam conflict constituted
that Court's greatest single failure during his tenure as a Justice. Yet even
the gravity of that choice, and the tension of the confrontation with Justice
Fortas, could not completely suppress Justice Stewart's humor. In a wry
moment, the Justice conjured for me an image of Supreme Court Marshal
T. Perry Lippitt, a prim and spindly character straight out of Dickens,
slogging through the rice paddies in his swallow-tailed coat to deliver a
copy of the Court's opinion to General Westmoreland, along with a writ
ordering the army out of Vietnam.
Justice Stewart's firm conviction that the republic deserves an explana-
tion of where its Supreme Court Justices stand on an issue-and
why-manifested itself in his policy of reading his dissents from the
bench, even after that practice had begun to fall into desuetude under
Chief Justice Burger. That conviction went hand-in-glove with his belief
that the explanation should be plainly put. Impatient with turgid prose,
the Justice always had a flair for potent metaphor and a deft turn of
phrase: a conviction obtained through a hasty nocturnal trial could not
stand because "swift justice demands more than just swiftness; ' 7 warrant-
less electronic eavesdropping of a public phone booth constituted an inva-
sion of privacy and an unlawful search because "the Fourth Amendment
protects people, not places;"" and arbitrary imposition of the death pen-
alty is "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lightning
is cruel and unusual." 9
But Justice Stewart's rhetorical powers were by no means limited to a
knack for aphorisms. When dissenting from the Court's decision to throw
the aegis of absolute judicial immunity over a state court judge who had
7. Henderson v. Bannan, 256 F.2d 363, 390 (6th Cir. 1958) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
8. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967) (Stewart, J., concurring).
9. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972).
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granted an ex parte petition to sterilize a 15-year-old girl without her
knowledge, the Justice declared from the bench that such lawless conduct
could never constitute a "judicial act": "A judge is not free, like a loose
cannon, to inflict indiscriminate damage whenever he announces that he is
acting in his judicial capacity."' The Justice filed an even more powerful
dissent from the Court's decision to jail a pedestrian porno peddler while
exonerating an established publishing house that had also been charged
with obscenity. Justice Stewart reminded his Brethren that, in "enforcing
the Bill of Rights, this Court has no power to pick or to choose. When we
lose sight of that fixed star of constitutional adjudication, we lose our way.
For then we forsake a government of law and are left with government by
Big Brother."11
Although he could express disagreement with great vigor, Justice Stew-
art's dissents did not partake of rancor or invective, nor did he treat differ-
ences of opinion as grounds for personal affront. When subsequent doctri-
nal developments would bear out a position he had earlier taken in
dissent, the Justice believed that it was really the law, and not his per-
sonal views, that had been vindicated.
Justice Stewart was equally eloquent when expressing the opinion of
the Court. He penned these words in a unanimous 1975 decision that
ordered the release of a man who had been imprisoned without cause as a
"mental patient" for 15 years:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its
citizens from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might
as well ask if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all
who are physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public in-
tolerance or animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation
of a person's physical liberty.
12
The heartfelt, if characteristically quiet, satisfaction which service on
the Supreme Court brought to Potter Stewart led him to opine, in a 1979
interview with Fred Graham, embargoed until the Justice' death, that ap-
pointment to that tribunal was "like dying and going to heaven." Yet it
would seem that heaven itself was not enough, for Justice Stewart retired
from the Court just two years later at the youthful age of 66. The incisive
intellect that had livened oral arguments was then devoted to deciding
cases in the federal courts of appeals, or to clarifying legal issues on public
10. Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 367 (1978) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
11. Ginsburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 501 (1966) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 575 (1975).
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television. And the sonorous voice that once filled the Court's marble
chamber was put to work recording legal texts for the blind.
But the Justice left no doubt that his primary reason for retiring was to
spend more time with his family. He had begun his service on the Su-
preme Court at the remarkably early age of forty-three, and when he left
the Court twenty-three years later he did so with no regrets. For the Jus-
tice was also an ordinary citizen, a husband and a father who savored his
private life as much as his public service. Although his unexpected and
untimely death cut short his retirement, there is every reason to believe
that Potter Stewart brought to the final years of his private life the same
quiet, unpretentious vigor that animated his years on the Supreme Court.
And I suspect that, surrounded by his grandchildren and relieved of the
serious responsibilities of the Court, he had a chance to indulge some of
the childlike whimsy that attracted him to the verses of Robert Louis Ste-
venson-verses that the Justice, according to his brother, Zeph Stewart,
scribbled down many years ago and carried in his wallet for the rest of his
days:
Must we to bed indeed? Well then
Let us arise and go like men,
And face with an undaunted tread
The long black passage up to bed.
Farewell, 0 brother, sister, sire!
0 pleasant party round the fire!
The songs you sing, the tales you tell,
Till far tomorrow, fare ye well!
As I stood in Arlington Cemetery last December, I thought of those
lines and my eyes were drawn to the small figure of one of Justice Stew-
art's grandchildren. The boy, a lad of at most five or six, did not, as
would befit his age, fidget in distraction during the funeral of a dimly
perceived grandparent. The child understood that someone who had come
to make a difference in his life was gone for good. As the cannon salute
echoed over the Virginia hills, the boy wept; for him, too, the loss of Pot-
ter Stewart was immediate and all too real.
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